CITF-学习笔记(5.4.1 Risk based approach)

5.4.1 基于风险的方法 Risk‑based approach

FATF于2014年推出的基于风险的方法要求成员司法管辖区首先识别，评估和了解他们面临的洗钱和恐怖主义融资风险。第二个建议的步骤是实施与这些风险相称的有效缓解措施（FATF，2014）。
The risk‑based approach, introduced by the FATF in 2014, requires member jurisdictions to first identify, assess and understand the money‑laundering and terrorist‑financing risks that they are exposed to. The second recommended step is to implement effective mitigation measures that are commensurate to those risks (FATF, 2014).

The key factors to consider when applying a risk‑based approach include:
1.product type;产品类型
2.jurisdiction;司法管辖
3.customer type;客户类型
4.volume and value of transactions.交易量和交易价值

通过采取基于风险的方法，银行可以确保将系统和控制重点放在风险最高的领域。金融行动工作组在其关于打击洗钱、资助恐怖主义和扩散的国际标准中也确定了同样的关键因素：金融行动工作组的建议。
By taking a risk‑based approach, banks can ensure they focus their systems and controls on areas of highest risk. The same key factors have also been identified by the FATF in their international standards on combatting money laundering, financing of terrorism and proliferation: the FATF Recommendations (see section 5.4.3).

注意事项:
1.本学习笔记仅用于本博客的交流学习，相关学习笔记均为本站整理资料。
2.欢迎读者交流分享，转载请注明出处“WWW.考试.NET”并严禁用于商业用途。
3.欢迎在博客下端评论、提出学习见解，本博客将尽快回复，对好的意见进行收录整理！

推荐链接：
本站主页
CITF学习笔记目录

返回：5.4 预防金融犯罪-Financial crime prevention

CITF-学习笔记(5.4 Financial crime prevention)

5.4 预防金融犯罪-Financial crime prevention

Financial crime is a global problem, and a number of international bodies have been created to pool resources in the fight against it. The FATF (covered in section 5.4.2) and the Wolfsberg Group (covered in section 5.4.3) promote a risk based approach to managing financial crime. CDD and KYC are inherent components of the risk based approach. You will learn about this specifically with reference to account opening and maintenance in section 5.4.5. Finally, you will learn about some key indicators of trade based financial crime in section 5.4.6.

5.4.1 Risk based approach
5.4.2 Financial Action Task Force
5.4.3 FATF Recommendations
5.4.4 The Wolfsberg Group
5.4.5 Financial intelligence units
5.4.6 Due diligence
5.4.7 Monitoring key indicators

注意事项:
1.本学习笔记仅用于本博客的交流学习，相关学习笔记均为本站整理资料。
2.欢迎读者交流分享，转载请注明出处“WWW.考试.NET”并严禁用于商业用途。
3.欢迎在博客下端评论、提出学习见解，本博客将尽快回复，对好的意见进行收录整理！

推荐链接：
本站主页
CITF学习笔记目录

CITF-学习笔记(5.3 Effects of financial crime)

5.3 金融犯罪的影响-Effects of financial crime

正如本专题开头所强调的，金融犯罪可能产生毁灭性影响，超出金融影响的范围，包括人民、社区和国家。对于银行本身来说，以下是成为金融犯罪的一方（无论多么不知不觉）而产生的两个关键风险。
As highlighted at the start of this topic, financial crime can have devastating effects, expanding beyond financial implications to include people, communities and countries. For banks themselves, the following are two key risks that arise from becoming party – however unwittingly – to financial crime.

声誉风险-Reputational risk
卷入重大洗钱或恐怖主义融资事件的银行的声誉将受到损害，这可能比任何罚款都要昂贵。此外，一家银行越是被认为在控制金融犯罪方面薄弱，它对犯罪分子的吸引力就越大，作为代理银行的吸引力就越小。许多银行都经历了一个合理化其代理银行网络的过程，以避免在没有足够高的合规标准的情况下暴露于银行。这个过程被广泛称为”去风险化“。
Banks that become involved in a major money‑laundering or terrorist‑financing incident will suffer damage to their reputation that may prove more costly than any fines imposed. Additionally, the more that a bank is perceived认为 to be weak in its control of financial crime, the more attractive it becomes to criminals and the less attractive it becomes as a correspondent bank. Many banks have undergone a process of rationalising their correspondent banking network to avoid potential exposure to banks without sufficiently high standards of compliance. This process is widely known as ‘de‑risking’.

代理银行-CORRESPONDENT BANK
“代表其他金融机构（通常是外国银行）作为代理人的银行或金融机构”（Bankrate，2018）。提供的服务包括跨境支付、资金管理、外汇和国际投资。
“Banks or financial institutions that act as an agent on behalf of other financial institutions, usually foreign banks” (Bankrate, 2018). Services offered include cross‑border payments, treasury management, foreign exchange and international investments.

法律风险-Legal risk
对违反与金融犯罪有关的条例的处罚可能从对金融机构的罚款到极端情况下的银行执照损失不等。个人可能被禁止在金融业工作，并可能面临监禁。因此，银行必须确保所有雇员都了解他们根据法律所承担的义务，并接受定期培训。
The penalties for breaching regulations relating to financial crime can range from fines on financial institutions to, in extreme cases, loss of banking licences. Individuals may be prevented from working in the finance industry and potentially face imprisonment. A bank must, therefore, ensure that all employees are informed of their obligations under the law and receive regular training.

每家银行都必须有书面的政策和程序，以应对与金融犯罪有关的犯罪升级。从业人员必须了解这些程序，并知道他们必须向谁报告怀疑。
Every bank must have written policies and procedures for escalating suspicions related to financial crime. Practitioners must be aware of these procedures and know to whom they must report suspicions.

注意事项:
1.本学习笔记仅用于本博客的交流学习，相关学习笔记均为本站整理资料。
2.欢迎读者交流分享，转载请注明出处“WWW.考试.NET”并严禁用于商业用途。
3.欢迎在博客下端评论、提出学习见解，本博客将尽快回复，对好的意见进行收录整理！

推荐链接：
本站主页
CITF学习笔记目录

CITF-学习笔记(5.2.8 Other forms of financial crime)

5.2.8 其他形式的金融犯罪-Other forms of financial crime

银行系统容易受到欺诈行为的影响。以下是从业者需要特别注意的一些问题。
The banking system is vulnerable to fraudulent acts. The following are some issues of which practitioners need to be particularly aware.

欺诈-FRAUD
通过欺骗、虚假伪装或虚假陈述窃取金钱、财产或服务。
Stealing money, property or services by deception, false pretences or misrepresentation.

伪造的签名-Forged signatures
银行几乎没有机会从签名被伪造的任何一方的汇票、支票或期票中收回。
A bank has virtually no chance of recovering on a draft, cheque or promissory note from any party whose signature has been forged.

假冒、有缺陷或不存在的商品-Fake, faulty or non‑existent goods
银行在贸易交易中经常依靠货物作为担保，如果货物本身没有价值，银行就没有担保。在放贷前对货物进行独立检查可以减轻这种风险。
Banks often rely on the goods for security in a trade transaction and if the goods themselves have no value, the bank has no security. An independent inspection of the goods prior to lending may mitigate this risk.

欺诈性索赔-Fraudulent claims
欺诈性索赔最常发生在保险业。一个常见的例子是夸大的索赔，其中丢失的价值被夸大，或者通过包括其他未损坏的货物来”添加”索赔。虽然相对罕见，但也可能针对即期担保和备用信用证提出欺诈性索赔。
Fraudulent claims occur most often in the insurance industry. A common example is inflated claims, where either the value of what is lost is exaggerated or the claim is ‘added to’ by including other goods that were not damaged. Whilst relatively rare, fraudulent claims may also be made against demand guarantees and standby letters of credit (see Topic 10).

网络犯罪-Cybercrime
世界银行系统的一些主要危险来自犯罪分子，他们打算通过非法入侵IT系统从银行或其客户那里窃取资金，经常为了自己的利益而转移资金和信息。网络犯罪的另一种常见形式是”网络钓鱼”，声称来自银行的电子邮件说服客户向犯罪分子透露密码和其他私人信息。
Some of the main dangers to the world banking system come from criminals intent on stealing money from banks or their clients by illegally hacking into IT systems, often diverting funds and information for their own benefit. Another common form of cybercrime is ‘phishing’, where emails purporting to come from banks persuade clients to reveal passwords and other private information to criminals.

与贸易有关的欺诈-Fraud related to trade
欺诈可能发生在国际供应链的不同环节。提单等运输单据可以伪造。有用的信息来源包括伦敦劳合社海上搜索检查和来自航运公司的公开信息，这些信息可以识别船只的旅程。文件可能包含虚假信息，旨在混淆欺诈易或获得无权获得的融资。
Fraud can take place at various points in international supply chains. Transport documents such as bills of lading can be forged. Useful sources of information include Lloyd’s of London Sea‑Searcher checks and publicly available information from shipping companies that identify vessel journeys. Documents can contain false information intended to obfuscate fraudulent deals or to obtain financing to which one is not entitled.

注意事项:
1.本学习笔记仅用于本博客的交流学习，相关学习笔记均为本站整理资料。
2.欢迎读者交流分享，转载请注明出处“WWW.考试.NET”并严禁用于商业用途。
3.欢迎在博客下端评论、提出学习见解，本博客将尽快回复，对好的意见进行收录整理！

推荐链接：
本站主页
CITF学习笔记目录

返回：5.2 金融犯罪的形式Forms of financial crime

CITF-学习笔记(5.2.7 扩散和扩散筹资-Proliferation and proliferation financing)

5.2.7 扩散和扩散筹资-Proliferation and proliferation financing

联合国安理会第1540号决议申明”核生化武器及其运载工具的扩散对国际和平与安全构成威胁”UN Security Council Resolution 1540 affirms that “the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security” (UNODA, 2004).

某些国家被指控使用化学武器或使用化学神经毒剂轰炸本国公民，对付生活在其他国家并被视为威胁的个人。国际上几乎一致同意，应遏制大规模毁灭性武器的扩散。欧盟等地区控制”两用物品的出口、过境和经纪活动”，作为确保国际和平与安全以及防止大规模杀伤性武器扩散的努力的一部分（欧盟委员会，2018年）。
Certain countries have been accused of bombing their own citizens using chemical weapons or using chemical nerve agents against individuals living in other countries who are seen to be a threat. There is near unanimous international agreement that the spread of weapons of mass destruction should be curtailed. Regions such as the EU control the “export, transit and brokering of dual‑use items” as part of efforts to ensure international peace and security, and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (European Commission, 2018).

—–KEY TERMS
扩散-Proliferation
数量或金额的突然增加。A sudden increase in number or amount.

扩散融资-Proliferation financing
违反国家法律，提供全部或部分用于制造、获取、拥有、开发、出口、转运、中间商交易、运输、转让、储存或使用核生化武器及其运载工具和相关材料（包括用于非合法目的的技术和两用货物）的资金或金融服务的行为， 或在适用的情况下，国际义务。
“[T]he act of providing funds or financial services which are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, export, trans‑shipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materials (including both technologies and dual use goods for non‑legitimate purposes), in contravention of national laws, or where applicable, international obligations.” (FATF, 2010)

两用物品 Dual‑use items
可用于民用和军用应用的商品、软件和技术。
Goods, software and technology that can be used for both civilian and military applications.

采取基于风险的方法 Taking a risk‑based approach
金融机构可以作出贡献的最明显方式是采取基于风险的办法，为涉及两用货物的交易制定有效的政策。这应该从对新客户进行客户尽职调查（CDD）和了解您的客户（KYC）检查时开始。强化的CDD还应包括对两用货物和高风险司法管辖区的检查。
The most obvious way that financial institutions can contribute is to adopt a risk‑based approach and have an effective policy in place for transactions involving dual‑use goods. This should begin when customer due diligence (CDD) and know your customer (KYC) checks are carried out on new customers. Enhanced CDD should also incorporate checks on dual‑use goods and high‑risk jurisdictions. You will learn more about KYC and CDD in section 5.4.5. Identification of dual‑use goods in trade transactions can be challenging given their complex and technical nature.

EXAMPLE
如果制药公司购买细菌菌株用于医学研究，这种交易可能会被认为是合法的。但是，如果发现买方从事另一个行业，那么显然必须进一步调查参与交易的所有各方。这些调查必须记录在案，并酌情报告怀疑。
If a pharmaceutical company purchases bacterial strains for medical research, such a transaction will probably be considered legitimate. If, however, the buyer is found to be engaged in another industry then clearly all parties involved in the transaction must be investigated further. These investigations must be documented and the suspicions reported as appropriate.

关于大规模毁灭性武器的大多数管制规定都属于制裁制度的范围。但是，银行人员必须意识到这些担忧并保持警惕。
Most of the regulatory provisions regarding weapons of mass destruction fall within sanctions regimes. However, bank personnel must be aware of these concerns and remain alert.

注意事项:
1.本学习笔记仅用于本博客的交流学习，相关学习笔记均为本站整理资料。
2.欢迎读者交流分享，转载请注明出处“WWW.考试.NET”并严禁用于商业用途。
3.欢迎在博客下端评论、提出学习见解，本博客将尽快回复，对好的意见进行收录整理！

推荐链接：
本站主页
CITF学习笔记目录

返回：5.2 金融犯罪的形式Forms of financial crime

CITF-学习笔记(5.2.6 制裁筛选-Sanctions screening)

 5.2.6 制裁筛选-Sanctions screening

许多系统提供了强大的筛选流程，事实证明，该流程比运营银行员工手动执行的检查要有效得多。然后，具有处理潜在问题技能的员工可以专注于在线系统生成的警报。Many systems provide a robust screening process that has proved to be far more effective than checks carried out manually by operational bank staff. Staff with the skills to deal with potential issues can then focus on alerts generated by online systems.

此类系统提供广泛的服务，并能够跟踪：
Such systems provide a wide range of services and have the ability to track:
1.marine vessels; 船
2.high‑risk organisations; and 组织
3.politically exposed persons (PEPs). 个人
Banks and financial institutions must focus on training and providing their staff with up‑to‑date knowledge in order for them to deal with the information generated. Detailed records of potential breaches and consequential actions must be maintained and retained.（必须维护和保留潜在违规行为和后果性行动的详细记录。）

CITF-学习笔记（5.2.5 与资助恐怖主义有关的制裁Sanctions relating to terrorist financing）

5.2.5 与资助恐怖主义有关的制裁Sanctions relating to terrorist financing

联合国定期向全球各国政府和银行的监管机构发布已知恐怖组织和个人的名单。
The UN regularly issues a list of known terrorist organisations and individuals to the regulatory agencies of governments and banks around the globe.

此外，一些国家对目标个人和国家实施金融制裁。银行将在其法律规定的范围内受到这些制裁。
In addition, some countries apply financial sanctions against targeted individuals and countries.Banks will be subject to these sanctions to the extent that their laws specify.

金融机构将把这些清单迁移到其支付和贸易交易中心和系统中。当 SWIFT 报文通过这些中心时，将根据名单对它们进行筛选，以检查是否受到制裁的个人和组织。Financial institutions will migrate these lists into their payment and trade transaction centres and systems. As SWIFT messages go through these centres, they will be screened against the lists to check for individuals and organisations subject to sanctions.

银行和金融机构的工作人员需要意识到制裁如何凌驾于其他国际公认的规则之上，例如您在之前的主题中了解到的ICC规则。例如，制裁推翻了国际刑事法院关于跟单信用证的规则，例如UCP 600。此外，使用制裁条款可能会造成混淆，特别是在需要确认的情况下。可能是确认跟单信用证的银行无法履行其约定，也无法向卖方付款，因为所提交的文件中含有违反制裁制度的要素。例如，因为运载货物的船舶属于受制裁制度管辖的国籍。
Staff at banks and financial institutions need to be aware of how sanctions can override other internationally accepted rules such as the ICC rules you learned about in earlier topics. For example, sanctions overrule ICC rules for documentary credits, eg UCP 600. Additionally, the use of sanctions clauses can cause confusion, especially where confirmation is required. It could be that a bank confirming a documentary credit is prevented from fulfilling its engagement and is prevented from paying the seller because of elements in the submitted documents that represent a violation of a sanction regime. For example, because the vessel carrying the goods is of a nationality subject to a sanction regime.

CITF-学习笔记（ 5.2.4 逃避制裁Sanctions evasion）

 5.2.4 逃避制裁Sanctions evasion

制裁是一种工具，可以用来要求个人、组织或国家遵守特定的规则或法律。大多数制裁是出于经济和（或）政治动机，可能包括冻结资产，包括付款;冻结资产;贸易限制;停止外交、文化和体育交流;甚至军事干预。制裁可由国家和超国家机构发布，并可采取不同形式。它们可以是预防性的，也可以是反应性的，也可以是国内或国际的焦点。
“Sanctions are a tool that can be used to persuade an individual, organisation or country to conform to specific rules or laws. Most sanctions are economically and/or politically motivated and may encompass the freezing of assets, including payments; restrictions on trade; cessation of diplomatic, cultural, and sport exchanges; and even military intervention. Sanctions may be issued by national and supranational bodies and can take on different forms. They can be preventative or reactive in nature, as well as domestic or international in focus.

虽然可以实施一系列不同的制裁，但对金融机构影响最大的制裁是金融制裁。这些通常限制或禁止将资金或经济资源转移给某些个人，实体甚至国家。
“制裁最常在国际上使用：
While a range of different sanctions may be applied, those most often impacting on financial institutions are financial sanctions. These generally restrict or prohibit the passing of funds or economic resources to certain individuals, entities, or even countries.”
“Sanctions are most often used internationally:
1.改变特定国家或政权的行为
to change the behaviour of a specific country or regime;
2.向特定国家或政权施压以取得成果
to pressure a specific country or regime to achieve an outcome;
3.防止资助恐怖主义
to prevent the financing of terrorism;
4.当国际和平与安全受到威胁时
when international peace and security is threatened;
5.当所有外交努力都失败时
when all diplomatic efforts have failed.”

注意事项:
1.本学习笔记仅用于本博客的交流学习，相关学习笔记均为本站整理资料。
2.欢迎读者交流分享，转载请注明出处“WWW.考试.NET”并严禁用于商业用途。
3.欢迎在博客下端评论、提出学习见解，本博客将尽快回复，对好的意见进行收录整理！

推荐链接：
本站主页
CITF学习笔记目录

返回：5.2 金融犯罪的形式Forms of financial crime

CITF-学习笔记（5.2.3 恐怖主义融资Terrorist financing）

5.2.3 恐怖主义融资Terrorist financing

然而，对恐怖主义没有单一的定义，因为金融行动工作组的定义包括”为对平民或对武装冲突局势中未积极参与敌对行动的任何其他人造成死亡或严重身体伤害而进行的有关意图的未指明行为，其目的是恐吓民众， 或政府或国际组织的强制行动
There is no single definition of terrorism, however, as a catch‑all the FATF definition includes“unspecified acts carried out with the relevant intention to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict with the purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling action by a government or an international organisation” (FATF, 2016).

影响：Implications of terrorist financing
任何参与恐怖主义融资的银行的声誉风险都可能是巨大的。其影响不仅仅是财务和声誉，而且可能是人类毁灭性的。
The reputational risk to any bank that becomes involved in terrorist financing is potentially huge.The implications are not just financial and reputational but may be devastating in human terms.

洗钱与恐怖主义融资之间的**相似之处**
Similarities between money laundering and terrorist financing
There are common features between money laundering and terrorist financing.
1.用于支持恐怖主义的资金的目的地必须以与洗钱资金来源相同的方式进行伪装。
The destination of money used to support terrorism has to be disguised in the same way as the source of laundered funds.
2.这两项活动都涉及金融部门。
Both activities involve the financial sector.

即使恐怖活动的资金来源是合法的，恐怖分子也常常试图掩盖这种资金来源，以保全未来的资金来源。所使用的许多技术将与用于掩盖犯罪收益来源的技术相同。
Even if the source of funding for terrorist activity is legitimate, terrorists will often attempt to disguise it in order to preserve future funding. Many of the techniques used will be the same as techniques used to disguise the sources of the proceeds of crime.
对于目前合法来源但将来用于恐怖主义行为提供资金的资产，银行在查明时也面临困难。
Banks also face difficulties in identifying assets that are derived from legitimate sources but are destined to fund future acts of terrorism.

预防-Prevention
防止洗钱和恐怖主义融资的关键是在关系开始时和持续的基础上采用强有力的客户尽职调查（CDD）程序（见第5.4.5节）。
The key to preventing both money laundering and terrorist financing is the adoption of robust customer due diligence (CDD) procedures, both at the commencement of a relationship and on a continuing basis (see section 5.4.5).

注意事项:
1.本学习笔记仅用于本博客的交流学习，相关学习笔记均为本站整理资料。
2.欢迎读者交流分享，转载请注明出处“WWW.考试.NET”并严禁用于商业用途。
3.欢迎在博客下端评论、提出学习见解，本博客将尽快回复，对好的意见进行收录整理！

推荐链接：
本站主页
CITF学习笔记目录

返回：5.2 金融犯罪的形式Forms of financial crime

CITF-学习笔记（5.2.2 基于贸易的洗钱活动的主要方法 Main methods used in trade‑based money laundering）

5.2.2 基于贸易的洗钱活动的主要方法
Main methods used in trade‑based money laundering

沃尔夫斯堡集团（Wolfsberg Group）、国际商会（ICC）和BAFT的一份报告强调了基于贸易的洗钱活动”掩盖资金非法流动”的主要方法。例子包括”歪曲商品的价格，质量或数量”（Wolfsberg Group，ICC和BAFT，2019）。
A report by the Wolfsberg Group, ICC and BAFT highlights the main methods used in trade‑based money laundering “to obscure the illegal movement of funds”. Examples include “misrepresent[ing] the price, quality or quantity of goods” (Wolfsberg Group, ICC and BAFT, 2019).

基于贸易的洗钱方法-Trade-based methods of money laundering
Method Description

开具超额发票Over‑invoicing
By misrepresenting the price of the goods in the invoice and other documentation (stating it at above the true value) the seller gains excess value as a result of the payment.
通过在发票和其他文件中歪曲货物的价格（说明其高于真实价值），卖方因付款而获得了超额价值。

发票不足额开具 Under‑invoicing
通过在发票和其他文件中歪曲货物价格（说明低于真实价值），买方在付款时获得了超额价值。
By misrepresenting the price of the goods in the invoice and other documentation (stating it as below the true value) the buyer gains excess value when the payment is made.

多重开票 Multiple invoicing
通过为同一货物开具多张发票，卖方可以证明收到多笔付款是合理的。如果串通方使用多个[金融机构]，这将更难检测。
By issuing more than one invoice for the same goods a seller can justify the receipt of multiple payments. This will be harder to detect if the colluding parties use more than one [financial institution].

短装 Short‑shipping
卖方出货量低于发票上开具的货物数量或质量，从而在单据中歪曲了货物的真实价值。效果类似于开具发票超支。
The seller ships less than the invoiced quantity or quality of goods, thereby misrepresenting the true value of goods in the documents. The effect is similar to over‑invoicing.

超装 Over‑shipping
卖方出货超过发票上开具的货物数量或质量，从而在单据中歪曲了货物的真实价值。效果类似于发票短支。
The seller ships more than the invoiced quantity or quality of goods, thereby misrepresenting the true value of goods in the documents. The effect is similar to under‑invoicing.

故意混淆商品类型 Deliberate obfuscation of the type of goods
当事人可以以某种方式构建交易，以避免引起对金融机构或涉及的其他第三方的任何怀疑。这可能只是涉及从相关文件中省略信息或故意伪装或伪造信息。这项活动可能涉及也可能不涉及有关各方之间一定程度的勾结，并且可能出于各种原因或目的。
Parties may structure a transaction in a way to avoid alerting any suspicion to FIs or to other third parties which become involved. This may simply involve omitting information from the relevant documentation or deliberately disguising or falsifying it. This activity may or may not involve a degree of collusion between the parties involved and may be for a variety of reasons or purposes.

幽灵运输 Phantom shipping
没有货物被运送，所有文件都是完全伪造的。
No goods are shipped and all documentation is completely falsified.

注意：在所有这些情况下，为了使非法活动最有可能成功，买方和卖方之间将存在勾结。例如，通过多开票，买方将清楚地意识到它被要求支付虚高的价格。当然，开具多发票的目的是在所谓的贸易交易之外，由买方向卖方分别支付非法付款。
Note: In all of these scenarios, in order for the illegal activity to have the most chance of success, there will be collusion between buyer and seller. For example, with over‑invoicing, the buyer will be well aware that it is being asked to pay an inflated price. The purpose of over‑invoicing is, of course, for an illegitimate payment to be made from the buyer to the seller separate and in addition to the purported trade transaction.

注意事项:
1.本学习笔记仅用于本博客的交流学习，相关学习笔记均为本站整理资料。
2.欢迎读者交流分享，转载请注明出处“WWW.考试.NET”并严禁用于商业用途。
3.欢迎在博客下端评论、提出学习见解，本博客将尽快回复，对好的意见进行收录整理！

推荐链接：
本站主页
CITF学习笔记目录

返回：5.2 金融犯罪的形式Forms of financial crime