月份：2022年3月

CITF 学习笔记(6.1 Sale and purchase of goods within the EU customs union)

Some goods do remain controlled and may not be exchanged, even between EU members, without formality:(有些货物确实受到控制，即使在欧盟成员国之间，也不得在没有手续的情况下进行交换)

  1. Excise goods – alcoholic drinks, tobacco and hydrocarbons.(消费税商品 – 酒精饮料、烟草和碳氢化合物。)
  2.  Animals and food products controlled under the EU Common Agricultural Policy.(欧盟共同农业政策下控制的动物和食品。)
  3. Military equipment.(军事装备。)
  4. Explosives (including fireworks) and firearms.(爆炸物（包括烟花）和枪支。)
  5. Prohibited (banned) and controlled (permission required) drugs.(禁止（禁止）和控制（需要许可）药物。)

记忆：酒、动物、军、农、药

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CITF 学习笔记(5.4.3金融行动工作组的建议 FATF Recommendations)

在审查了洗钱者使用的技术和洗钱活动的趋势之后，金融行动工作组公布了载有40项建议的国际标准。这些建议最近一次更新是在2020年10月。
Following an examination of the techniques used by launderers and trends in money‑laundering activity, the FATF published international standards containing 40 recommendations. These recommendations were most recently updated in October 2020.

FATF的建议提出了各国应采取的全面和一致的措施框架，以打击洗钱和资助恐怖主义行为，以及资助大规模毁灭性武器扩散。各国拥有不同的法律、行政和业务框架以及不同的金融体系，因此不可能都采取相同的措施来应对这些威胁。
“The FATF Recommendations set out a comprehensive and consistent framework of measures which countries should implement in order to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Countries have diverse legal, administrative and operational frameworks and different financial systems, and so cannot all take identical measures to counter these threats.” (FATF, 2020d)

“The FATF Recommendations set out the essential measures that countries should have in place to:

  • identify the risks, and develop policies and domestic co‑ordination;识别风险，制定政策和国内协调
  • pursue money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation;追究洗钱、资助恐怖主义和资助扩散
  • apply preventive measures for the financial sector and other designated sectors;对金融部门和其他指定部门采取预防措施
  • establish powers and responsibilities for the competent authorities (eg investigative, law enforcement and supervisory authorities) and other institutional measures;确立主管当局（如调查、执法和监督当局）的权力和责任以及其他体制措施
  • enhance the transparency and availability of beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements; 提高法人和安排的实益拥有权信息的透明度和可用性
  • facilitate international co‑operation.”促进国际合作
    (FATF, 2020d)

The 40 FATF Recommendations are grouped in the following categories:
a. anti‑money‑laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) policies and co‑ordination;反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义（CFT）政策和协调
b. money laundering and confiscation;洗钱和没收
c. terrorist financing and financing of proliferation;资助恐怖主义和资助扩散
d. preventive measures;预防措施
e. transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons and arrangements;法人和安排的透明度和实益拥有权
f. powers and responsibilities of competent authorities, and other institutional measures;主管当局的权力和责任以及其他体制措施
g. international co‑operation.主管当局的权力和责任以及其他体制措施
(FATF, 2020d)

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CITF 学习笔记(5.4.2 金融行动特别工作组Financial Action Task Force)

定义：金融行动特别工作组（FATF）是全球洗钱和恐怖主义融资监管机构。该政府间机构制定国际标准，旨在防止这些非法活动及其对社会造成的危害。作为一个决策机构，FATF致力于产生必要的政治意愿，以便在这些领域进行国家立法和监管改革。
“The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. The inter-governmental body sets international standards that aim to prevent these illegal activities and the harm they cause to society. As a policy-making body, the FATF works to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas.” (FATF, 2020b)

FATF制定了一系列建议，这些建议”构成了协调应对 [. . .] 对金融体系完整性的威胁的基础，并有助于确保公平的竞争环境。FATF建议于1990年首次发布，分别于1996年、2001年、2003年和最近一次于2012年进行了修订，以确保这些建议保持[最新]和相关性，并旨在普遍适用。
The FATF developed a series of recommendations that “form the basis for a co‑ordinated response to [. . .] threats to the integrity of the financial system and help ensure a level playing field. First issued in 1990, the FATF Recommendations were revised in 1996, 2001, 2003 and most recently in 2012 to ensure that they remain [current] and relevant, and they are intended to be of universal application” (The Wolfsberg Group, ICC and BAFT, 2019).

FATF监测其成员在实施必要措施方面的进展，审查洗钱和恐怖主义融资技术和对策，并促进全球采取和实施适当措施。FATF与其他国际利益攸关方合作，致力于识别国家层面的薄弱环节，以保护国际金融体系不被滥用。
“The FATF monitors the progress of its members in implementing necessary measures, reviews money laundering and terrorist financing techniques and counter‑measures, and promotes the adoption and implementation of appropriate measures globally. In collaboration with other international stakeholders, the FATF works to identify national‑level vulnerabilities with the aim of protecting the international financial system from misuse.” (John et al., 2014)

在撰写本文时（2021年3月），FATF有39名成员，其中37个是司法管辖区，两个是欧盟委员会和海湾合作委员会，是区域组织。此外，还有一些国际和区域组织是反洗钱金融行动工作组的联系成员、观察员国家和观察员组织，它们参加了金融行动工作组的工作。此外，FATF拥有FATF式区域机构网络，创建了一个由205个司法管辖区组成的全球网络。FATF总部设在巴黎经济合作与发展组织。
At the time of writing (March 2021), the FATF had 39 members of which 37 are jurisdictions and two, the European Commission and Gulf Co‑operation Council, are regional organisations. In addition, there are international and regional organisations that are associate members, observer countries and observer organisations of the FATF that participate in its work. In addition, the FATF has a network of FATF‑style regional bodies (FSRBs), creating a global network of 205 jurisdictions. The FATF headquarters is housed at the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development in Paris.

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CITF-学习笔记(5.4.1 Risk based approach)

5.4.1 基于风险的方法 Risk‑based approach

FATF于2014年推出的基于风险的方法要求成员司法管辖区首先识别，评估和了解他们面临的洗钱和恐怖主义融资风险。第二个建议的步骤是实施与这些风险相称的有效缓解措施（FATF，2014）。
The risk‑based approach, introduced by the FATF in 2014, requires member jurisdictions to first identify, assess and understand the money‑laundering and terrorist‑financing risks that they are exposed to. The second recommended step is to implement effective mitigation measures that are commensurate to those risks (FATF, 2014).

The key factors to consider when applying a risk‑based approach include:
1.product type;产品类型
2.jurisdiction;司法管辖
3.customer type;客户类型
4.volume and value of transactions.交易量和交易价值

通过采取基于风险的方法，银行可以确保将系统和控制重点放在风险最高的领域。金融行动工作组在其关于打击洗钱、资助恐怖主义和扩散的国际标准中也确定了同样的关键因素：金融行动工作组的建议。
By taking a risk‑based approach, banks can ensure they focus their systems and controls on areas of highest risk. The same key factors have also been identified by the FATF in their international standards on combatting money laundering, financing of terrorism and proliferation: the FATF Recommendations (see section 5.4.3).

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CITF-学习笔记(5.4 Financial crime prevention)

5.4 预防金融犯罪-Financial crime prevention

Financial crime is a global problem, and a number of international bodies have been created to pool resources in the fight against it. The FATF (covered in section 5.4.2) and the Wolfsberg Group (covered in section 5.4.3) promote a risk based approach to managing financial crime. CDD and KYC are inherent components of the risk based approach. You will learn about this specifically with reference to account opening and maintenance in section 5.4.5. Finally, you will learn about some key indicators of trade based financial crime in section 5.4.6.

5.4.1 Risk based approach
5.4.2 Financial Action Task Force
5.4.3 FATF Recommendations
5.4.4 The Wolfsberg Group
5.4.5 Financial intelligence units
5.4.6 Due diligence
5.4.7 Monitoring key indicators

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CITF-学习笔记(5.3 Effects of financial crime)

5.3 金融犯罪的影响-Effects of financial crime

正如本专题开头所强调的，金融犯罪可能产生毁灭性影响，超出金融影响的范围，包括人民、社区和国家。对于银行本身来说，以下是成为金融犯罪的一方（无论多么不知不觉）而产生的两个关键风险。
As highlighted at the start of this topic, financial crime can have devastating effects, expanding beyond financial implications to include people, communities and countries. For banks themselves, the following are two key risks that arise from becoming party – however unwittingly – to financial crime.

声誉风险-Reputational risk
卷入重大洗钱或恐怖主义融资事件的银行的声誉将受到损害，这可能比任何罚款都要昂贵。此外，一家银行越是被认为在控制金融犯罪方面薄弱，它对犯罪分子的吸引力就越大，作为代理银行的吸引力就越小。许多银行都经历了一个合理化其代理银行网络的过程，以避免在没有足够高的合规标准的情况下暴露于银行。这个过程被广泛称为”去风险化“。
Banks that become involved in a major money‑laundering or terrorist‑financing incident will suffer damage to their reputation that may prove more costly than any fines imposed. Additionally, the more that a bank is perceived认为 to be weak in its control of financial crime, the more attractive it becomes to criminals and the less attractive it becomes as a correspondent bank. Many banks have undergone a process of rationalising their correspondent banking network to avoid potential exposure to banks without sufficiently high standards of compliance. This process is widely known as ‘de‑risking’.

代理银行-CORRESPONDENT BANK
“代表其他金融机构（通常是外国银行）作为代理人的银行或金融机构”（Bankrate，2018）。提供的服务包括跨境支付、资金管理、外汇和国际投资。
“Banks or financial institutions that act as an agent on behalf of other financial institutions, usually foreign banks” (Bankrate, 2018). Services offered include cross‑border payments, treasury management, foreign exchange and international investments.

法律风险-Legal risk
对违反与金融犯罪有关的条例的处罚可能从对金融机构的罚款到极端情况下的银行执照损失不等。个人可能被禁止在金融业工作，并可能面临监禁。因此，银行必须确保所有雇员都了解他们根据法律所承担的义务，并接受定期培训。
The penalties for breaching regulations relating to financial crime can range from fines on financial institutions to, in extreme cases, loss of banking licences. Individuals may be prevented from working in the finance industry and potentially face imprisonment. A bank must, therefore, ensure that all employees are informed of their obligations under the law and receive regular training.

每家银行都必须有书面的政策和程序，以应对与金融犯罪有关的犯罪升级。从业人员必须了解这些程序，并知道他们必须向谁报告怀疑。
Every bank must have written policies and procedures for escalating suspicions related to financial crime. Practitioners must be aware of these procedures and know to whom they must report suspicions.

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CITF-学习笔记(5.2.8 Other forms of financial crime)

5.2.8 其他形式的金融犯罪-Other forms of financial crime

银行系统容易受到欺诈行为的影响。以下是从业者需要特别注意的一些问题。
The banking system is vulnerable to fraudulent acts. The following are some issues of which practitioners need to be particularly aware.

欺诈-FRAUD
通过欺骗、虚假伪装或虚假陈述窃取金钱、财产或服务。
Stealing money, property or services by deception, false pretences or misrepresentation.

伪造的签名-Forged signatures
银行几乎没有机会从签名被伪造的任何一方的汇票、支票或期票中收回。
A bank has virtually no chance of recovering on a draft, cheque or promissory note from any party whose signature has been forged.

假冒、有缺陷或不存在的商品-Fake, faulty or non‑existent goods
银行在贸易交易中经常依靠货物作为担保，如果货物本身没有价值，银行就没有担保。在放贷前对货物进行独立检查可以减轻这种风险。
Banks often rely on the goods for security in a trade transaction and if the goods themselves have no value, the bank has no security. An independent inspection of the goods prior to lending may mitigate this risk.

欺诈性索赔-Fraudulent claims
欺诈性索赔最常发生在保险业。一个常见的例子是夸大的索赔，其中丢失的价值被夸大，或者通过包括其他未损坏的货物来”添加”索赔。虽然相对罕见，但也可能针对即期担保和备用信用证提出欺诈性索赔。
Fraudulent claims occur most often in the insurance industry. A common example is inflated claims, where either the value of what is lost is exaggerated or the claim is ‘added to’ by including other goods that were not damaged. Whilst relatively rare, fraudulent claims may also be made against demand guarantees and standby letters of credit (see Topic 10).

网络犯罪-Cybercrime
世界银行系统的一些主要危险来自犯罪分子，他们打算通过非法入侵IT系统从银行或其客户那里窃取资金，经常为了自己的利益而转移资金和信息。网络犯罪的另一种常见形式是”网络钓鱼”，声称来自银行的电子邮件说服客户向犯罪分子透露密码和其他私人信息。
Some of the main dangers to the world banking system come from criminals intent on stealing money from banks or their clients by illegally hacking into IT systems, often diverting funds and information for their own benefit. Another common form of cybercrime is ‘phishing’, where emails purporting to come from banks persuade clients to reveal passwords and other private information to criminals.

与贸易有关的欺诈-Fraud related to trade
欺诈可能发生在国际供应链的不同环节。提单等运输单据可以伪造。有用的信息来源包括伦敦劳合社海上搜索检查和来自航运公司的公开信息，这些信息可以识别船只的旅程。文件可能包含虚假信息，旨在混淆欺诈易或获得无权获得的融资。
Fraud can take place at various points in international supply chains. Transport documents such as bills of lading can be forged. Useful sources of information include Lloyd’s of London Sea‑Searcher checks and publicly available information from shipping companies that identify vessel journeys. Documents can contain false information intended to obfuscate fraudulent deals or to obtain financing to which one is not entitled.

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返回：5.2 金融犯罪的形式Forms of financial crime

CITF-学习笔记(5.2.7 扩散和扩散筹资-Proliferation and proliferation financing)

5.2.7 扩散和扩散筹资-Proliferation and proliferation financing

联合国安理会第1540号决议申明”核生化武器及其运载工具的扩散对国际和平与安全构成威胁”UN Security Council Resolution 1540 affirms that “the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security” (UNODA, 2004).

某些国家被指控使用化学武器或使用化学神经毒剂轰炸本国公民，对付生活在其他国家并被视为威胁的个人。国际上几乎一致同意，应遏制大规模毁灭性武器的扩散。欧盟等地区控制”两用物品的出口、过境和经纪活动”，作为确保国际和平与安全以及防止大规模杀伤性武器扩散的努力的一部分（欧盟委员会，2018年）。
Certain countries have been accused of bombing their own citizens using chemical weapons or using chemical nerve agents against individuals living in other countries who are seen to be a threat. There is near unanimous international agreement that the spread of weapons of mass destruction should be curtailed. Regions such as the EU control the “export, transit and brokering of dual‑use items” as part of efforts to ensure international peace and security, and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (European Commission, 2018).

—–KEY TERMS
扩散-Proliferation
数量或金额的突然增加。A sudden increase in number or amount.

扩散融资-Proliferation financing
违反国家法律，提供全部或部分用于制造、获取、拥有、开发、出口、转运、中间商交易、运输、转让、储存或使用核生化武器及其运载工具和相关材料（包括用于非合法目的的技术和两用货物）的资金或金融服务的行为， 或在适用的情况下，国际义务。
“[T]he act of providing funds or financial services which are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, export, trans‑shipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materials (including both technologies and dual use goods for non‑legitimate purposes), in contravention of national laws, or where applicable, international obligations.” (FATF, 2010)

两用物品 Dual‑use items
可用于民用和军用应用的商品、软件和技术。
Goods, software and technology that can be used for both civilian and military applications.

采取基于风险的方法 Taking a risk‑based approach
金融机构可以作出贡献的最明显方式是采取基于风险的办法，为涉及两用货物的交易制定有效的政策。这应该从对新客户进行客户尽职调查（CDD）和了解您的客户（KYC）检查时开始。强化的CDD还应包括对两用货物和高风险司法管辖区的检查。
The most obvious way that financial institutions can contribute is to adopt a risk‑based approach and have an effective policy in place for transactions involving dual‑use goods. This should begin when customer due diligence (CDD) and know your customer (KYC) checks are carried out on new customers. Enhanced CDD should also incorporate checks on dual‑use goods and high‑risk jurisdictions. You will learn more about KYC and CDD in section 5.4.5. Identification of dual‑use goods in trade transactions can be challenging given their complex and technical nature.

EXAMPLE
如果制药公司购买细菌菌株用于医学研究，这种交易可能会被认为是合法的。但是，如果发现买方从事另一个行业，那么显然必须进一步调查参与交易的所有各方。这些调查必须记录在案，并酌情报告怀疑。
If a pharmaceutical company purchases bacterial strains for medical research, such a transaction will probably be considered legitimate. If, however, the buyer is found to be engaged in another industry then clearly all parties involved in the transaction must be investigated further. These investigations must be documented and the suspicions reported as appropriate.

关于大规模毁灭性武器的大多数管制规定都属于制裁制度的范围。但是，银行人员必须意识到这些担忧并保持警惕。
Most of the regulatory provisions regarding weapons of mass destruction fall within sanctions regimes. However, bank personnel must be aware of these concerns and remain alert.

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返回：5.2 金融犯罪的形式Forms of financial crime

CITF-学习笔记(5.2.6 制裁筛选-Sanctions screening)

 5.2.6 制裁筛选-Sanctions screening

许多系统提供了强大的筛选流程，事实证明，该流程比运营银行员工手动执行的检查要有效得多。然后，具有处理潜在问题技能的员工可以专注于在线系统生成的警报。Many systems provide a robust screening process that has proved to be far more effective than checks carried out manually by operational bank staff. Staff with the skills to deal with potential issues can then focus on alerts generated by online systems.

此类系统提供广泛的服务，并能够跟踪：
Such systems provide a wide range of services and have the ability to track:
1.marine vessels; 船
2.high‑risk organisations; and 组织
3.politically exposed persons (PEPs). 个人
Banks and financial institutions must focus on training and providing their staff with up‑to‑date knowledge in order for them to deal with the information generated. Detailed records of potential breaches and consequential actions must be maintained and retained.（必须维护和保留潜在违规行为和后果性行动的详细记录。）

CITF-学习笔记（5.2.5 与资助恐怖主义有关的制裁Sanctions relating to terrorist financing）

5.2.5 与资助恐怖主义有关的制裁Sanctions relating to terrorist financing

联合国定期向全球各国政府和银行的监管机构发布已知恐怖组织和个人的名单。
The UN regularly issues a list of known terrorist organisations and individuals to the regulatory agencies of governments and banks around the globe.

此外，一些国家对目标个人和国家实施金融制裁。银行将在其法律规定的范围内受到这些制裁。
In addition, some countries apply financial sanctions against targeted individuals and countries.Banks will be subject to these sanctions to the extent that their laws specify.

金融机构将把这些清单迁移到其支付和贸易交易中心和系统中。当 SWIFT 报文通过这些中心时，将根据名单对它们进行筛选，以检查是否受到制裁的个人和组织。Financial institutions will migrate these lists into their payment and trade transaction centres and systems. As SWIFT messages go through these centres, they will be screened against the lists to check for individuals and organisations subject to sanctions.

银行和金融机构的工作人员需要意识到制裁如何凌驾于其他国际公认的规则之上，例如您在之前的主题中了解到的ICC规则。例如，制裁推翻了国际刑事法院关于跟单信用证的规则，例如UCP 600。此外，使用制裁条款可能会造成混淆，特别是在需要确认的情况下。可能是确认跟单信用证的银行无法履行其约定，也无法向卖方付款，因为所提交的文件中含有违反制裁制度的要素。例如，因为运载货物的船舶属于受制裁制度管辖的国籍。
Staff at banks and financial institutions need to be aware of how sanctions can override other internationally accepted rules such as the ICC rules you learned about in earlier topics. For example, sanctions overrule ICC rules for documentary credits, eg UCP 600. Additionally, the use of sanctions clauses can cause confusion, especially where confirmation is required. It could be that a bank confirming a documentary credit is prevented from fulfilling its engagement and is prevented from paying the seller because of elements in the submitted documents that represent a violation of a sanction regime. For example, because the vessel carrying the goods is of a nationality subject to a sanction regime.